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Abstract. This paper tries to empirically verify the argument that institutional factors such as enforcement mechanisms, 
political and economic stability, stable and reliable, transparent legal and regulatory framework and corruption are critical 
in explaining the behaviour of the foreign direct investment inﬂ ows in Turkey. The main objective of the study is to ascer-
tain the nature of the obstacles and impediments to the greater ﬂ ow of foreign direct investments into Turkish economy for 
the recent period by focusing on the results of a questionnaire applied to the executives of 52 multinational corporations 
operating in Turkey in 2006.
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1. Introduction
Since 1980, the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in-
ﬂ ows to developing countries have been substantially 
increasing and compared to other capital ﬂ ows, have 
remained the largest component of net resource ﬂ ows 
to developing countries (UNCTAD 2006a). In these 
countries, governments believe that FDI will help eco-
nomic development and they try to attract FDI through 
policies and investment incentives designed to increase 
investor interest in an attempt to beneﬁ t from the po-
tential economic development. Hence, with the lib-
eralization of many developing economies, FDI has 
become a crucial medium through which developing 
economies become uniﬁ ed on a global basis. 
On the other hand, despite several efforts of govern-
ments, Turkey has never been able to attract the sub-
stantial FDI inﬂ ows that would be expected from a 
nation with a strategic location between Europe, the 
Middle East and Central Asia2.  
In this paper, I conducted a questionnaire survey to 
explore the mechanisms linking macroeconomic vari-
ables and political institutions to FDI ﬂ ows, and inter-
viewed representatives of Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs) operating in Turkey in order to understand 
the reasons of low level of FDI ﬂ ows into the country.
2. FDI Performance of Turkey 
from a Comparative Perspective
Turkish FDI levels have stagnated during the 1990s 
while total FDI worldwide increased by a factor of 
12. This lack of interest by multinational companies 
becomes even clearer when FDI inﬂ ows are adjusted to 
the size of the economy. Over the last decade, the aver-
age FDI inﬂ ows to middle-income countries in Europe 
were 1.1 percent of GDP compared to less than 0.5 
percent in Turkey. As shown in the following ﬁ gure, 
this disparity is considerably greater when Turkey is 
compared to the countries investors considered to be 
its main regional competitors: Hungary, the Czech Re-
public, and Poland.
Fig. 1 reveals the inward FDI stock levels of selected 
emerging economies as a percentage of GDP. Com-
Journal of Business Economics and Management
www.jbem.vgtu.lt
2009
10(1): 15–30
DOI: 10.3846/1611-1699.2009.10.15-30ISSN 1611-1699 print
16
paring Turkey with other emerging economies such as 
Brazil, Mexico, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Poland, 
it can be argued that the inward FDI performance of 
Turkey is ineffective. The level of FDI stock in Turkey 
remained stagnant at approximately 10 percent during 
the 1990s, ﬂ uctuated after 2000 and reached approxi-
mately 12 percent in 2005. Whereas inward FDI stock 
of all other countries increased signiﬁ cantly. Hungary 
and the Czech Republic are the most successful coun-
tries at attracting increasing inward FDI stock. The 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, 
although entering the competition in the beginning of 
the 1990s, attracted more FDI in comparison to Turkey 
in the period.  
Another way to view Turkey’s relative FDI perform-
ance as a host country is in terms of two indices devel-
oped by UNCTAD: The FDI Performance Index and 
the FDI Potential Index. 
Table  1. The Inward FDI Performance Index Rankings
Se lec ted 
Countries                              
 2003–
2005
2002–
2004
2001–
2003
2000–
2002
Czech Republic 32 25 13 10
Hungary 40 46 33 27
Poland 57 75 68 56
Mexico  75 79 61 64
Brazil  82 62 46 37
Argentina 83 82 82 85
Turkey 95 111 110 109
Source: UNCTAD  2006a. 
The Inward FDI Performance Index ranks countries by 
the FDI they receive relative to their economic size. It 
is the ratio of a country’s share in global FDI inﬂ ows to 
its share in global GDP (Table 1)3. The Index is shown 
for three-year periods to offset annual ﬂ uctuations in 
the data and covers 141 economies for as much of the 
period as the data permit; however, some economies 
in transition could not be ranked in the early years for 
lack of data or because they did not exist as separate 
countries4. 
According to the inward performance index, Turkey 
ranks  95th with a score of 0.917. This low score in-
dicates that Turkey receives less FDI than its relative 
economic size.
A more complex index, the Inward FDI Potential Index, 
captures several factors (apart from market size) ex-
pected to affect an economy’s attractiveness to foreign 
investors. It is an average of the values of 12 variables5: 
Table 2. The Inward FDI Potential Index Rankings
Selected 
Countries
2003–
2005
2002–
2004
2001–
2003
2000–
2002
Hungary 37 40 41 43
Czech Republic 39 39 42 42
Poland 43 43 44 46
Mexico  53 51 50 49
Argentina 67 66 77 52
Turkey 68 72 72 74
Brazil  71 70 68 73
Source: UNCTAD 2006a.
  Fig. 1. Inward FDI Stock as percentage of GDP in Selected Emerging Economies 
Source: UNCTAD 2006b
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Table 2 demonstrates that, Turkey has a better posi-
tion than Inward FDI performance index, however, 
still standing behind other emerging markets. Central 
and East European countries are more successful than 
selected Latin American countries. The strength in edu-
cation and infrastructure in these countries makes them 
attractive, especially for ﬁ rms motivated by vertical 
strategy. 
According to the matrix of the FDI potential and FDI 
performances of the countries, Turkey takes place 
within the list of countries that have high FDI poten-
tial but low FDI performance6. In order to understand 
the reasons why countries attract different amounts of 
FDI,  in speciﬁ c, why Turkey receives FDI ﬂ ows below 
its potential, a brief overview of the existing literature 
on the determinants of FDI is of the essence. 
3. The Determinants of Foreign Direct 
Investment and the role of Institutions
3.1. Core Theories of FDI
The motives for investing abroad either by establish-
ing a new corporation or investing in established ﬁ rms 
have received remarkable attention from scholars7. 
Their main concern is answering the question: What 
explains patterns of FDI ﬂ ows across the globe? 
The literature on determinants of FDI is very new. 
The early writings on FDI go back only to the 1950s. 
Until the 1960s, except for a few works by political 
economists, there was no systematic explanation of, 
model of or theory on FDI activities. Stephen Hymer 
(1976) made the ﬁ rst theoretical approach8. He was 
one of the ﬁ rst scholars to separate FDI from port-
folio investment and initiated a new literature on the 
determinants of FDI. Through 1960 and 1970 new 
theories of FDI were introduced. Vernon (1966) used 
the product life cycle approach, which is based on the 
existence of market imperfections across nations, to 
develop a theory of foreign direct investment. Later, 
it was argued that monopolistic advantages, which 
are created by both advertising and research and de-
velopment investments, characterize not just speciﬁ c 
ﬁ rms but rather ﬁ rms within oligopolistic industries. 
Knickerbocker (1973) showed evidence that the tim-
ing of U.S. MNCs’ FDI is largely determined by their 
oligopolistic reaction “follow the leader” theory to 
competitors’ investment. 
While industrial organization models were the domi-
nant line in studying FDI until the 1970s, a new theory, 
called “internationalization theory,” was proposed to 
explain how ﬁ rms are involved in international op-
erations and make resource commitments to foreign 
markets. The term “internationalization” is used to de-
scribe an evolutionary process in which the ﬁ rm gradu-
ally increases its international involvement. 
In the 1970s, Dunning’s eclectic paradigm dominated 
the literature. Dunning introduced the concept of “OLI” 
as a theoretical framework to analyze the determinants 
of FDI. This framework considers FDI as determined 
by Ownership, Location and Internalization advantages 
of ﬁ rms investing abroad (Dunning 1970). The OLI 
paradigm has remained the center of FDI theory and 
other scholars have expanded on this framework. 
More recently, the motives of FDI have been exam-
ined in two categories. In this view a ﬁ rm realizes the 
investment to better serve the local market or to get 
lower-cost inputs, or both. In other words, FDI can be 
divided into “horizontal” or “market-seeking” FDI, and 
“vertical” or “efﬁ ciency-seeking” FDI.
The ﬁ rst involves building plants in a host country 
to supply the local market. This approach is done to 
reduce the costs that arise from supplying the mar-
ket through exporting, in which case, market size and 
high tariffs play a large role in determining proﬁ tabil-
ity. The latter category of vertical FDI is production 
cost-minimizing, where ﬁ rms seek to produce in lower 
cost locations or seek inexpensive inputs in order to 
export their product. Inexpensive inputs include natu-
ral resources, raw materials, or low-cost inputs such 
as labour. In other words, differentiation between the 
two is that market-seeking FDI aims at penetrating the 
local markets of the host country, whereas efﬁ ciency-
seeking FDI is interested in creating new sources of 
competitiveness for ﬁ rms. 
Finally, Asset-Seeking FDI is the most recent motive 
for FDI to be identiﬁ ed. It refers to a strategy that aims 
to access and exploit technological assets in overseas 
countries. Developed countries are the main recipients 
of R&D investment, but countries such as Hungary, 
Czech Republic, India and Brazil are also attracting 
more and more Research and Development projects. 
Asset-seeking MNCs focus on the skilled labour 
availability, research institutes, large supply of gradu-
ate labour, created assets including innovative capac-
ity, technological adoption, and technical skills when 
choosing an investing location (Michalet 1997: 12–15). 
FDI driving forces and outcomes for host economies 
have been thoroughly analyzed in recent scientiﬁ c lit-
erature (Ginevičius and Tvaronavičienė 2003, 2004; 
Tvaronavičienė and Degutis 2007; Tvaronavičienė and 
Grybaitė 2007; Tvaronavičienė et al. 2008; Degutis 
and Tvaronavičienė 2006).
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3.2. The Role of Institutions
As seen above, studies of FDI ﬂ ows at the ﬁ rm level, 
in common, emphasize that ﬁ rms as proﬁ t maximizing 
agents are motivated by exploiting their own advan-
tages abroad, such as access to patented technology, 
speciﬁ c management or marketing skills or ownership 
of brand names. This view is ﬁ rm-level centered, yet, 
in these studies; the role of social, political and eco-
nomic institutions has rarely been treated. 
On the other hand, since the 1990s, in the international 
literature, the number of studies mentioning the im-
portance of institutions determining economic growth 
and FDI has increased signiﬁ cantly. Especially in the 
economic growth literature, a number of scholars such 
as Knack and Keefer (1995: 207–227), Mauro (1995: 
681–712), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. 
(2002, 2005) have emphasized that political, institu-
tional and legal environment of a country, to a great 
extent, determine the economic performance. Institu-
tions lead to a fall in both transaction and informa-
tion costs by reducing uncertainty and establishing 
a therefore stable structure to facilitate interactions, 
deﬁ ne and enforce property rights; and determine the 
degree of competition by deﬁ ning the terms of market 
entry (North 1990; Coase 1960). Hence, the stronger 
the political, economic and social institutions are, the 
higher the economic growth rates realized will be.   
Institutions can be economic, political or social in na-
ture. Economic institutions determine the “economic 
rules of the game”–in particular, the degree of prop-
erty rights enforcement, the set of contracts that can 
be written and enforced, and some of the rules and 
regulations that determine the economic opportunities 
open to agents (individual property rights, commercial 
law, contract law, patent law, the type of credit arrange-
ments, etc.)9.
The institutional framework has three components: 
formal rules, informal rules, and enforcement mecha-
nisms. Formal rules are the written rules of a society. 
Laws governing contracts, crime, political systems, 
product information, the imposition of tariffs or quo-
tas, the regulation of banks, and so on are all formal 
institutions (North 1990: 36–61). Formal rules can be 
created by ﬁ rms as well as governments.
Informal rules are the unwritten rules of a society. 
These include culture, norms of behaviour, codes of 
conduct, and so on. Citizens of a country grow up 
learning all kinds of unwritten norms and attitudes and 
informal rules differ across nations (for example, meal 
times are often set by custom).
The third component of the institutional framework is 
enforcement. Institutions often are ineffective if they 
are not enforced. For example, a nation can have anti-
trust laws that prevent ﬁ rms from becoming monopo-
lies, but if the government does not enforce such laws, 
businesses may act as if the antitrust law did not exist. 
Some institutions are self-enforcing (for example, driv-
ing on the right side of the road when no police are in 
sight). Enforcement is not an all-or-nothing phenom-
enon. Countries may enforce laws strongly, margin-
ally, or not at all. Enforcement is an integral part of a 
nation’s institutional framework and may be the single 
most important element in explaining differences in 
economic performance (North 1990: 54–61).
3.3. FDI and institutions literature review
In the international literature, scholars studying the 
relationship between institutions and FDI face several 
difﬁ culties for the reason that, institutional variables 
are not readily available. To meet the needs for an 
in-depth and exhaustively researched analysis of the 
non-economic variables such as potential risks to in-
ternational business operations, several organizations 
created statistical models to calculate risks and backed 
it up with analyses that explain the numbers and ex-
amine what the numbers do not show. The result is a 
comprehensive system that enables various types of 
risk to be measured and compared between countries.
The data measuring the quality of institutional vari-
ables are produced by independent private ﬁ rms who 
provide consulting services to international investors 
such as the PRS Group publishing the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG), the Freedom House (FH), 
or the Transparency International (TI). To a certain 
extent, these indices provide very similar informa-
tion on various aspects of institutions. However, some 
should pay attention to the facts that ﬁ rst indices can be 
considered to be subjective and more important, they 
measure the perceptions of governance quality rather 
than its actual quality. 
In the literature there are several empirical studies 
mentioning the importance of institutional variables by 
applying econometric models or questionnaire surveys. 
Empirical research on the impact of host country insti-
tutions on FDI has demonstrated that the general insti-
tutional, social and legal framework inﬂ uences FDI.
Wei (1997) states that corruption within the political 
system is a threat to foreign investment by distorting 
the economic and ﬁ nancial environment, reducing the 
efﬁ ciency of the government and business by enabling 
people to assume positions of power through patronage 
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rather than ability, and introducing inherent instability 
into the political process. Mauro (1997) uses the Busi-
ness International (BI) indices to argue that corruption 
does in fact hurt growth and investment. The ﬁ ndings 
of Habib and Zurawicki (2001) support the argument 
that high level of corruption deters FDI. 
A number of studies mention that lack of political and 
economic stability, unclear regulatory frameworks, an 
inexperienced bureaucracy, an underdeveloped court 
system deter more FDI inﬂ ows to host economies. 
Wheeler and Mody (1992) examine American ﬁ rms 
investing abroad and write that political risk factors, 
the functioning of the bureaucracy, corruption and judi-
cial system have strong impact on these ﬁ rms and they 
emphasize that these facts had strong negative impact 
on MNCs operating abroad. 
Gastanaga et al. (1998) examined the relationship be-
tween political variables and FDI and found that high 
enforcement mechanisms, low corruption levels affect 
FDI positively. Oxley (1999) and Smarzynska (1999) 
found that weak property rights inhibit FDI inﬂ ows. 
In his comprehensive study, Jensen (2006) states that the 
overall effect of democratic institutions is positive and 
democracies should be associated with higher inﬂ ows 
of FDI. Li and Resnick (2003) argue that incremental 
improvements in property rights protection induce a 
more attractive environment for foreign direct investors. 
In his doctorate dissertation, Dumludag (2007) applies 
panel data regressions (factor analysis) including 67 
developing countries for the period 1984–2005. The re-
sults of the dissertation make a real contribution to the 
empirical literature by validating the role of a large set 
of institutional variables (such as democratic account-
ability, corruption, investment proﬁ le, government 
stability, political rights, and civil liberties) on foreign 
direct investment ﬂ ows. Dumludag and Sukruoglu 
(2007) ﬁ nd the same results when they applied panel 
data regressions for 22 emerging countries.  
The second group of cross-country analyses including 
more recent data emphasizes the importance of human 
capital as a signiﬁ cant determinant of FDI.  Noorbakhsh 
et al. (2001) using a dataset that covers the 1980s to the 
mid-1990s, empirically tested the hypothesis that the 
level of human capital in host countries may affect the 
geographical distribution of FDI. These empirical ﬁ nd-
ings are: (a) human capital is a statistically signiﬁ cant 
determinant of FDI inﬂ ows; (b) human capital is one of 
the most important determinants; and (c) its importance 
has become increasingly greater through time. Nun-
nenkamp and Spatz (2002) report that efforts to provide 
better education and training would enhance the eco-
nomic growth effects of FDI in developing countries.
4. The Turkish case and the survey
This paper tries to empirically verify the argument that 
in institutional factors such as enforcement mecha-
nisms, political and economic stability, civil and politi-
cal rights and corruption are also critical in explaining 
the behaviour of the foreign direct investment inﬂ ows 
in case of the Turkish economy.
There is a growing literature on FDI inﬂ ows to Turkey. 
While some of them focus on the macroeconomic or 
microeconomic variables as determinants, some con-
duct surveys and list the results by using macro data, 
industry data, and ﬁ rm level data. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Selik (1961), Esiner (1966), 
Oksay (1967), Bulutoglu (1970), in their descriptive 
studies, explained regulations concerning FDI and 
every legal and procedural step to be taken by the po-
tential investor in Turkey. However, the studies lack 
guidelines on how to improve the investment climate 
and how to encourage a greater inﬂ ow of the foreign 
capital urgently needed for the development of Turkey.
Tuncer (1968) represents the most serious and scien-
tiﬁ c research undertaken in Turkey on the subject of 
FDI in the 1960s. It is comprehensive and objective 
and it seems to be the result of extensive documentary 
research. The study concludes that the place of foreign 
investment in the total private investment in Turkey 
is not important and its effect on employment is not 
signiﬁ cant because of its concentration in capital in-
tensive operations.
In the 1970s the number of studies using questionnaire 
surveys increased. Ashkin (1972) used techniques such 
as documentary research, questionnaire surveys, and 
personal interviews. He shows the dimensions of for-
eign ﬁ rms containing foreign capital in Turkey, the at-
titudes of these ﬁ rms towards the Turkish economy, the 
investment and ﬁ nancial climate, government applica-
tions and public opinion. Later, Şahin (1975), arguing 
that the statistical data were unreliable spent his time 
searching for reliable data. He also used the results 
of questionnaires (79 of 112 ﬁ rms containing foreign 
capital). According to his questionnaire results, he 
conﬁ rms that FDI inﬂ ow in Turkey is below the level 
expected in the period examined and then offers sug-
gestions in order to attract more FDI.  
In 1979 Uras, who is a former DPT expert, wrote a 
book titled Türkiye’de Yabancı Sermaye Yatırımları 
(Foreign Direct Investment in Turkey). During his 
research, he administered a questionnaire to the staff 
of a number of ﬁ rms containing foreign capital. Er-
dilek (1982) investigated the microeconomic causes 
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and effects of FDI in Turkish manufacturing. Erdilek 
collected data from individual ﬁ rms directly (46 of 
83 ﬁ rms) through extensive interviews and a ques-
tionnaire designed for the study. His work shows the 
contribution of FDI into manufacturing sector, clariﬁ es 
the low level of FDI inﬂ ow into Turkey, and offers 
policy suggestions. Also Karluk (1982) discusses the 
dimensions of foreign ﬁ rms containing foreign capital 
in Turkey. In addition, Karluk looks at other country 
cases and furnishes examples. In Turkey he admin-
istered questionnaires to 51 of 146 ﬁ rms. Like other 
researchers, he found that FDI inﬂ ow was insigniﬁ cant. 
Erdilek (1986) evaluated the effects of the change in 
the attitude of governments’ toward FDI for the post-
1980 period.  
In the 1990s without creating a theoretical framework, 
Erden (1996) presents the questionnaire results ac-
quired from 217 of 2.358 ﬁ rms. Erden evaluates the 
export, employment, and tax revenue contributions of 
FDI ﬁ rms and reveals the attitudes of these ﬁ rms to-
ward the Turkish economic climate and government 
policies. Tatoğlu (1998) in his doctorate dissertation 
provides an empirical analysis of the core dimensions 
of FDI activity based on primary data collected from 
Western multinationals engaged in either wholly-
owned subsidiaries or joint ventures and from local 
Turkish ﬁ rms which are partners in joint ventures in 
Turkey.
In a recent study, Foreign Investor Advisory Service of 
the World Bank (FIAS) conducted reports, mentioning 
the importance of institutions without building a theo-
retical framework. FIAS of the World Bank Group was 
asked in September 2000 to study the FDI environment 
and make recommendations for its improvement, as 
part of the World Bank Group’s 2001–2003 Country 
Assistance Strategy for Turkey, which stressed the im-
portance of FDI repeatedly and underscored the role of 
FIAS in improving Turkey’s FDI environment.
FIAS, with the support of the Turkish government and 
with cooperation of the private sector, prepared two 
studies:  A Diagnostic Study of the Direct Foreign In-
vestment Environment in Turkey in February 2001, 
and: Turkey: Administrative Barriers to Investment in 
June 2001. The reports pointed administrative barriers, 
political and economic stability, slow and partial judi-
cial system as an impediment to new investments and 
suggested workshops and establishment of study groups 
focusing on the issues such as company registration, 
sectoral licensing, land access and site development, 
taxation and incentives, intellectual property rights, in-
vestment legislation and investment promotion.
While there are some other studies dealing with FDI 
in Turkey in the form of articles, books or chapters in 
books, the studies mentioned here are the best known 
and most comprehensive ones. Their common ele-
ments are that the authors administered questionnaires 
to FDI ﬁ rms, applied econometric models, they relied 
on primary sources, in some cases generated their own 
statistical data by collecting sources, and they exam-
ined the contribution of FDI ﬁ rms to Turkish economy, 
the reasons for the low level of FDI inﬂ ow and ﬁ nally, 
most of them offer similar suggestions to increase the 
inﬂ ow of FDI.
On the other hand, not all of them built strong theo-
retical frameworks from an institutional perspective 
or conducted complete surveys of theoretical studies. 
While some of them focus on the macroeconomic or 
microeconomic variables as determinants, some con-
duct surveys and list the results without coherent theo-
retical framework.
4.1. Questionnaire Survey 
In my empirical analysis, I engaged in substantial 
ﬁ eldwork in 2006. I conducted a questionnaire survey 
to explore the mechanisms linking macroeconomic 
variables and political institutions to FDI ﬂ ows, and 
interviewed representatives of Multinational Corpora-
tions (MNCs) operating in Turkey. In these interviews 
I asked both open-ended and closed-ended questions 
regarding the factors that were important in multina-
tionals selecting investment locations, and I followed 
up these questions with speciﬁ c questions on how 
they evaluated the importance of speciﬁ c policies and 
institutions10. Also, I had the opportunity to conduct 
interviews with some of the representatives of non-
governmental organizations.
The questionnaire not only examines the impact of 
institutional variables on FDI, but also the effect of 
horizontal and vertical strategies is examined. The 
case study of how institutional, horizontal and verti-
cal variables affect FDI in Turkey is the result of ﬁ eld 
work of twenty weeks. The questionnaires were sent 
in October 2006 and the receiving of the results was 
completed in February 2007. The questions examine 
the period between 2001 and 2006. The answers of 
the questions are converted to numeric values (from 
very low: 1 to very high: 5, very unimportant to very 
important 1:5). The questionnaire survey was drafted 
in such a manner as to follow a systematic comparison 
of the investment environment surveys of the World 
Bank and UNCTAD.
The MNCs ﬁ rms are at the top of 500 big (accord-
ing to initial capital stock) MNCs in located on the 
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website of the Undersecretariat of Treasury in Turkey. 
All participants in the study were guaranteed complete 
conﬁ dentiality in their responses. Hence, in-keeping 
with this conﬁ dentiality clause, the data presented in 
this paper is based upon the summary statistics drawn 
from the database of survey respondents.
The questionnaires were sent by mail to 300 execu-
tives of MNCs. However, 52 executives returned their 
surveys. 18 ﬁ rms replied that they were either unable 
or unwilling to participate in the study, most stating 
company policy and/or conﬁ dentiality issues as rea-
sons for their non-participation. A further 40 question-
naire packets were returned unopened and given the 
fact that these ﬁ rms had recently relocated.
In the survey, 40 of 52 respondents were general man-
agers; ﬁ ve of them were ﬁ nance managers, four of 
them marketing managers and three of them assistant 
general managers. 
The sectoral distribution of responding ﬁ rms is dem-
onstrated in Fig. 2.
Thirty-seven percent of the ﬁ rms belong to ﬁ nancial 
intermediation; manufacturing is the second largest 
sector with a share of 27 percent to which the respond-
ents belong. The transport, storage and communica-
tions sector is the third largest sector with 12 percent. 
Wholesale and Retail Trade has eight percent, whereas, 
construction sector has a share of four percent. Other 
sectors, including agriculture, electricity, real estate, 
wholesale and retail have 12 percent in total.
On the other hand, the sectoral distribution of MNCs 
operating in Turkey by 2006 can be seen in Fig. 3. 
According to Fig. 3, 40 percent of the MNCs in Tur-
key operate in the ﬁ nancial intermediation sector. The 
transport, storage and communications sector has a 
share of 38 percent, very close to ﬁ nancial interme-
diation. Third largest sector MNCs belong to is manu-
facturing with a share of eleven percent. The wholesale 
and retail trade sector has a share of ﬁ ve percent.    
The sectoral distribution of respondents ﬁ rms is similar 
to the sectoral distribution of total MNCs in Turkey, 
except that the second largest sector is manufacturing 
with 27 percent in the questionnaire survey, whereas it 
is the third largest sector with a share of 11 percent. On 
the other hand, the transport, storage and communica-
tions sector is the second largest sector with 38 percent 
in Turkey, it has a share of 12 percent in the survey.
Executives of MNCs agree that Turkey’s one of the strong-
est attractions is its large domestic market. The consen-
sus on this is very strong, and is seen in every survey11. 
Table 3 demonstrates that growth of the market with 
a mean of 4.29 is the initial motive for foreign inves-
tors operating in Turkey. The size of the market with a 
mean of 3.69 and penetration into a new market with a 
mean of 3.33 show that the Turkish economy is attrac-
tive for foreign investors regarding horizontal strategy. 
To watch or forestall a competitor’s motive with the 
lowest mean of 2.38 implies that foreign investors pay 
attention to market size economy more than just fore-
stalling a competitor’s action. 
High mean scores of horizontal strategy (higher than 
vertical strategy) reveal that the most important mo-
tives are the market size related indicators. The execu-
tives, during the interviews, mentioned the importance 
of the growth of the market and added that thanks to 
stabilization policies, they expect continuous high 
growth rates. 
From Table 4 it could be suggested that although hori-
zontal strategy is a priority for foreign investors, ver-
tical strategy also plays an important role for them. 
Turkey scores higher in availability of skilled labour 
than its East European competitors. In 2000 Turkey 
Fig. 2. Sectoral Distribution of MNCs – Survey 
Results – 2006. Other: agriculture, electricity, 
real estate, wholesale and retail trade
Fig. 3. Sectoral Distribution of FDI in Turkey. Other: 
Agriculture, construction, electricity, gas and water supply, 
health and social work, hotels and restaurants, real estate
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ranked eighth in the world in terms of the availability 
of competent senior managers (plus, ranked third in 
the world for the average number of hours worked per 
year), well ahead of Hungary 31st , Poland 40th and the 
Czech Republic 46th 12.
Table 3. Motives for Foreign Direct Investment in Turkey
Horizontal 
Strategy
Indicators 
Number of 
Responses
Mod  Mean
                            
Standard
Deviation
Growth of the 
market 51 5 4.29 1.183
Size of the 
market 52 4 3.69 0.781
Penetration into 
a new market 52 3 3.33 1.167
Anticipation of 
relatively high 
proﬁ ts 52 2 3.29 1.21
To watch or 
forestall a 
competitor’s 
motive 50 1 2.38 1.455
Table 4. Motives for Foreign Direct Investment in Turkey
Resource, 
Efﬁ ciency,
Asset-Seeking 
Strategy                                 
Number of 
Responses
Mod Mean
                            
Standard
Deviation
Cheap labour 51 3 3.37 1.183
Export base for 
neighbouring 
markets 49 4 3.24 1.234
Availability of 
skilled labour 51 4 3.22 0.808
Availability 
of industrial 
infrastructure 52 3 3.12 1.132
Cost of 
transportation 48 3 3.08 0.895
Innovative 
capacity, 
technological 
skills,
technological 
adoption 47 4 3.06 1.009
Gaining access 
to raw materials 50 3 2.78 1.25
In Turkey not only cheap labour for foreign investors 
is appropriate (with a mean 3.37), but the availability 
of skilled labour is also important with a mean score 
of 3.22. Some should take into account that most of the 
respondents belong to ﬁ nancial intermediation which 
require skilled labour in most cases. As export base 
for neighbouring countries, with a mean of 3.24 is also 
signiﬁ cant. Turkey is located between Europe and the 
Middle East and Caucasus. Therefore several foreign 
investors consider Turkey as an export base for these 
countries or regions. The availability of industrial in-
frastructure has a mean of 3.12. With a mean score of 
2.78, gaining access to raw materials is at the bottom of 
the list. Interestingly, gaining access to raw materials 
does not play an important role for foreign investors. 
Turkey is not rich in petrol, iron or electricity or such 
kinds of resources, therefore foreign investors do not 
prefer to choose Turkey just in order to gain access to 
raw materials. 
Table 5 supports the idea that foreign investors wel-
come long-term strategy of the governments and the 
way that policies were applied. Long-term strategy 
including adjustment and stabilization policies has a 
mean score of 3.85.
Turkey experienced foreign exchange shocks during 
the 1990s and the volatility of exchange started to de-
crease after 2001. Therefore in Table 5 we see that 
foreign investors are pleased with foreign exchange 
Table 5. Motives for Foreign Direct Investment 
in Turkey
Economic 
Indicators and 
Economic 
Environment                
Number of 
Responses
Mod Mean
                            
Standard
Deviation
Long-term 
strategy 
(adjustment 
and Stabilization 52 4 3.85 1.017
Foreign exchange 
policy 47 4 3.34 1.069
Trade regulations 49 3 3.1 0.984
Investment 
incentives 50 2 2.98 1
Investment 
Promotion 50 2 2.88 1.172
Investment 
facilitation 49 2 2.86 1.19
FDI track record 46 2 2.7 0.94
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policies of the government. Foreign exchange policy 
has a mean of 3.34. The trade regulations indicator has 
a mean of 3.10.
The results of the questionnaire survey in this sec-
tion indicate that executives of the MNCs operating 
in Turkey ﬁ nd that investment incentives, investment 
promotion, FDI track record and investment facilita-
tion are not prior motives for their company to invest 
in Turkey. In the survey, investment incentives with a 
score 2.98, investment facilitation with a mean score 
of  2.86 and FDI track record with a mean of 2.7 are 
at the bottom of the list.  Investment promotion has a 
mean score of 2.88 which indicates that Turkey would 
need to engage in a concerted and focused marketing 
effort to advertise itself as an attractive investment lo-
cation abroad. However, Turkey was unable to succeed 
in establishing a promotion agency until recently and 
the agency does not have a strong and clear mandate, 
setup and budget. 
Developing a long-term FDI promotion strategy is 
crucial for several reasons; ﬁ rst, prospective investors, 
even the largest ﬁ rms, do not systematically search the 
world for opportunities. Information is imperfect and 
risk perceptions may not conform wholly to reality.
The search for opportunities is a bureaucratic proc-
ess whose initiation and direction may be swayed by 
many factors, some of which are not purely objective. 
Many emerging economies such as Malaysia, Poland, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, and Singapore 
have active IPA. The IPAs of these countries build 
techniques to include advertising in general and spe-
cialized media; participate in investment exhibitions; 
facilitate investment missions from source countries; 
and conduct general information seminars on invest-
ment opportunities. Some IPAs go further and use the 
techniques including direct mail campaigns, industry 
or sector-speciﬁ c investment missions or informational 
seminars, and one-on-one, face-to-face meetings with 
selected potential investors.
4.2. The role of institutional variables
In Turkey for foreign investors, political and macr-
oeconomic instability are seen as the most signiﬁ cant 
facts that hinder higher inﬂ ows of FDI. Stability is a 
crucial factor when it comes to FDI because it is a way 
that investors measure the security of their investment 
and want to see prior to establishing their investment 
in a host country. It indicates the likelihood that the 
government in power will be destabilized in uncon-
stitutional way or by violent means. Where investors 
are uncertain about a country’s political and economic 
stability they adopt a “wait and see” attitude. 
Table 6. Barriers to Foreign Direct Investment in Turkey
 (General) Number of 
Responses
Mod Mean
                            
Standard
Deviation
Political 
instability 52 5 4.37 0.817
Macroeconomic 
instability 52 5 4.35 0.738
Exchange rate 
risks 49 4 3.92 1.017
Inﬂ ation 47 4 3.89 0.759
Insufﬁ cient 
development of 
ﬁ nancial markets 49 3 3.22 1.066
Slow progress of 
privatization prog. 48 3 3.02 1.101
Possible obstacles 
against 
EU membership 
process 47 2 2.89 1.088
Competition 
with Central and 
East European 
Countries 48 3 2.88 1.044
In the survey (Table 6), political instability has a mean 
of 4.37 and macroeconomic instability has a mean of 
4.35. In Turkey, some link political stability with a 
single-party government rather than with coalition par-
ties ruling the country. However, indicators of political 
stability are government effectiveness, regulatory qual-
ity, and the rule of law. Most investors, when creating 
a business plan or project proposal, want to be able to 
estimate costs, competition, regulations, and potential 
returns.
Economic stability can be captured in macro-economic 
indicators, such as inﬂ ation and growth. It can be ar-
gued that only if the country can provide a politically 
and economically more stable and open environment, 
can more speciﬁ c efforts, targeted at improving the in-
vestment environment directly, be effective.
High mean scores of exchange rate risk and inﬂ a-
tion reﬂ ect how respondents consider the 2001–2006 
period when answering the survey. If the survey had 
been applied ﬁ ve years earlier the mean scores would 
be much higher. However, the exchange risk and 
risk of inﬂ ation with mean scores of 3.92 and 3.89 
are welcome as deterrent indicators for investors.
Insufﬁ cient development of ﬁ nancial markets has a 
3.22 mean score. Progress in establishing ﬁ nancial 
infrastructure and capital markets is important for 
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foreign investors because it facilitates access to local 
capital markets. The better developed markets encour-
age business to set up operations, as they can access 
complementary local ﬁ nance more easily, and face 
lower transaction costs for local ﬁ nancial services such 
as the payment system.  However, foreign investors 
may substitute locally raised capital for capital raised 
on international capital markets, which would lead to 
a reduction of recorded FDI inﬂ ow. Nonetheless, the 
received consensus is that the former effect dominates 
over the latter.
Although in many studies the positive effect of priva-
tization on FDI is emphasized, interestingly, the slow 
progress of privatization programs does not have a pri-
ority as an obstacle of higher FDI inﬂ ow with a mean 
score of 3.02. 
Privatization is a signal to multinational investors that 
a country is ready to foster a competitive market econ-
omy. FDI can also be very useful to a nation’s privati-
zation process by bringing in additional management 
expertise and marketing channels. Given that, Turkey 
needs signiﬁ cant FDI to enhance its infrastructure and 
to achieve its privatization goals, it needs a good en-
vironment for privatization and private participation in 
infrastructure. It also needs to privatize to attract even 
more FDI13.
Also, possible obstacles against EU membership do 
not have a priority as an obstacle to higher FDI inﬂ ow 
with a mean score. 
Interestingly, respondents do not identify Central and 
East European countries as primary competitors of Tur-
key. However, during the FIAS ﬁ eld mission in 2000, 
more than 50 foreign and domestic ﬁ rms interviewed 
identiﬁ ed Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic as 
primary competitors of Turkey for FDI attraction. This 
ﬁ nding is also supported in the study of H. Loewendahl 
and E. Loewendahl (2001).
Table 7 demonstrates signiﬁ cant results regarding in-
stitutional variables. Anti-competitive practices by the 
government (with a mean of 3.98), consistency and 
predictability of ofﬁ cials’ interpretations of regula-
tions (with a mean of 3.92), unstable and unreliable, 
non-transparent legal and regulatory framework (with 
a mean of 3.84) problems with recognition of patent 
rights (with a mean of 3.81) and corruption (with a 
mean of 3.80) are signiﬁ cant facts hindering the higher 
level of FDI inﬂ ows for foreign investors.
Beyond the establishment of markets as basic institu-
tion for the exchange of goods and services, regulatory 
institutions such as a competition policy are required.
While liberalization has been rapid throughout the de-
veloping countries including Turkey, the process of 
designing and implementing competition policy has 
been far more complex14.  
Governments in the less reformed countries continue 
to protect the markets of their local ﬁ rms, even at the 
sub-national level. Studies, especially those focusing 
on transition economies reveal that only successful im-
Table 7. Barriers to Foreign Direct Investment in Turkey
Institutions,
Administrative 
Barriers            
Number of 
Responses
Mod Mean
                            
Standard
Deviation
Anti-competitive 
practices by 
government 47 4 3.98 0.872
Consistency/
predictability 
of ofﬁ cials’ 
interpretations 
of regulations 51 4 3.92 0.744
Unstable and 
unreliable, non-
transparent legal 
and regulatory 
framework 50 5 3.84 1.131
Problems with 
recognition of 
patent rights 48 4 3.81 0.915
Corruption 45 4 3.8 1.079
Start up 
procedures 49 3 3.76 0.99
Too many days 
to resolve a 
commercial 
dispute in the 
country’s courts 46 3 3.59 0.884
Lack of 
enforcement 
of laws and 
Contracts  to 
compete 
effectively 50 4 3.54 1.014
Complex, slow 
and expensive 
property 
registration 
process 48 3 3.54 0.824
Delays in the 
courts 48 3 3.5 0.968
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plementation has a strong positive relationship with the 
economy-wide intensity of competition, whereas the 
mere existence of rules does not. 
The rule of law refers to the enforceability of contracts, 
something on which foreign investors place great im-
portance. Investors want to know that their rights and 
their business will be protected when operating abroad. 
Corruption diminishes the rule of law, most simply be-
cause some businesses do not operate within the law 
and this reduces fair competition.
Unstable and unreliable, a non-transparent legal and 
regulatory framework with a mean of 3.84 is re-
garded as one of the most important deterrent fac-
tors by respondents. This is because an efﬁ cient legal 
infrastructure reduces institutional uncertainties for 
foreign investors, facilitates the establishment and 
enforcement of contracts and in various other ways 
reduces the transaction costs of doing business in an 
economy. Turkey has fallen behind many other de-
veloping countries in effective liberalization of its 
legal framework, and in its enforcement practices 
to reap the beneﬁ ts of the rapid globalization that is 
transforming international economic relationships. 
Poor implementation of existing legislation is one the 
main problems in Turkey. Missing implementing rules 
and administrative guidelines, inconsistent application 
of laws, incompetent bureaucrats in charge, and lack 
of judicial enforcement are the issues mentioned most 
frequently by foreign investors in interviews. 
From the perspective of foreign investors, legislative 
reform in Turkey does not appear to be sufﬁ ciently reli-
able. Adopted laws are often not implemented on time. 
One of the executives replied to the question about 
the newly enacted laws: “Are you satisﬁ ed with the 
progress in the judicial system? By giving an answer, 
governments may carry on enacting laws; however, we 
are suspicious about the way they are interpreted”. An-
other point frequently raised by investors is a lack of 
conﬁ dence in the impartiality and quality of the com-
mercial courts. Plus, most of the executives mentioned 
that unstable, non-transparent legal and regulatory 
framework make the Turkish business environment 
difﬁ cult to operate. Some argued that recently enacted 
laws about the recognition of patent rights are not ap-
plied with sensitivity.
Corruption is another issue raised by investors. While 
the recent government efforts to curb corruption de-
serve much praise, investors suggested that they do 
not trust in the impartiality of administrators in critical 
cases, especially in customs administration and mu-
nicipal level procedures such as site development. Cor-
ruption is marked in the Transparency International’s 
year 2000; according to corruption perception index 
Turkey ranks 50th among 90 nations listed (Transpar-
ency International 2006).
Most of the executives I interviewed mentioned that 
corruption is a deterrent factor for foreign ﬁ rms. I 
asked whether corruption may make things easier in 
the ﬁ rst steps (the short term) of the investment proc-
ess. All the answers emphasized that large corporations 
pay special attention to the institutional organization of 
the corporations. An institutionalized corporation pays 
special attention to certainty when operating in another 
country. Corruption makes things uncertain in a busi-
ness environment which in the end may have negative 
effect on all ﬁ rms operating in the long run.
The weakness of the judicial system and enforcement 
of contracts and the recognition of property rights cre-
ate a feeling of insecurity and arbitrariness. Under 
such circumstances, the long-term commitment of 
substantial investment funds seems risky if plans are 
challenged or overturned from day to day, or when-
ever an ofﬁ cial is replaced. The weakness of the ju-
dicial system causes the increasing and unrestrained 
power of such ofﬁ cials. Plus, in countries in which 
the enforcement mechanisms are weak, the share of 
informal economy is large, in parallel. In other words, 
compliance with the formal institutions is too costly 
and the government does not have the power to ef-
fectively enforce its costly rules in these countries.
It is important to improve the enforcement of dispute 
resolution and “conﬂ ict of interest” legislation. 
However, in Turkey the executives that I interviewed 
emphasized that some of the laws in Turkey are am-
biguous and therefore difﬁ cult to enforce. The rule of 
law is perceived as weak by foreign investors. This 
problem can be improved by creating an independent 
dispute resolution mechanism or by improving the le-
gitimacy of those responsible for regulating legal dis-
putes and contracts.
Not only are the administrative procedures time-con-
suming; enforcement procedures for commercial cas-
es at the courts take much longer than in many other 
countries. 
The protection of intellectual property rights is par-
ticularly important for producers with a high rate of 
innovation like computer software developers or phar-
maceuticals, as well as producers of products with 
well-known trademarks like some beverages, clothes, 
or automobiles. As globalization has taken hold, good 
IPR protection is becoming more and more important 
to attract world-class technology and the export-orient-
ed plants that have to use it. 
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As in other dimensions of the business environment 
in Turkey, the major problems in IPR protection are 
caused not so much by inadequate laws as by a lack 
of effective enforcement. Internationally known brand 
names and trademarks are increasingly subject to il-
legal exploitation and pirating. Since 1992, the US 
Treasury has listed Turkey on its Priority Watch List, 
under its Special 301 provision for continuous viola-
tion of intellectual property rights (FIAS 2001a, b).
Whole legal framework for intellectual property rights 
is relatively new in Turkey, and much effort has been 
spent on fulfilling obligations stemming from the 
membership of the WTO and the accession to the EU. 
In the survey, administrative barriers such as complex, 
slow and expensive property registration process and 
too many days to resolve a commercial dispute in the 
country’s courts have 3.59 and 3.50 mean scores. The 
mean scores are signiﬁ cant although these indicators 
stay behind the several institutional variables in the list.
4.3. The Quality and Integrity of Public Services
The overall quality and efﬁ ciency of services gives 
an idea about the legislation, infrastructure, and the 
sensitivity towards protecting property rights. As they 
ﬁ nd these services attractive, they inform of the qual-
ity of the services to the foreign investors outside the 
country. 
The overall quality and efﬁ ciency of services delivered 
by the following public agencies or services (1 very 
bad to 5 very good) are presented in Table 8.
Table 8. Functioning of Institutions and Public Services
Indicators 
             
Number of 
Responses
Mod Mean
                            
Standard
Deviation
Property rights 49 3 3.14 0.89
Labour 
regulations 49 3 3.04 1.06
Business 
licensing 47 3 3.02 0.737
Tax regulations/
administration 49 3 2.69 0.713
When the quality and integrity of public services are 
considered, it can be argued that indicators such as 
property rights, labour regulations and business licens-
ing have moderate mean scores except for the qual-
ity of tax regulations and administration. Property 
rights has a mean score of 3.14; labor regulations – 
3.04, and business licensing – 3.02. Executives, dur-
ing the interviews, mentioned that tax regulations were 
complex, inefﬁ cient and hence, a deterring factor for 
FDI inﬂ ows.   
Table 9 demonstrates that whereas indicators belong-
ing to infrastructure have high mean scores, adminis-
trative and legislative issues have relatively low scores. 
Communication service is at the top of the list with a 
mean score of 3.87. Electric power has a mean score 
of 3.51, while transportation service has a score of 3.40 
and the quality of roads has a mean score of 3.22. On 
the other hand, the quality of the functioning of gov-
ernment comes after the indicators of infrastructure 
with a mean score of 3.16. The score of 2.86 for the 
parliament and 2.65 for the judicial system reveal that 
foreign investors are suspicious about the quality of 
legislative and administrative functioning. 
Table 9. Infrastructure and Legislation 
(1 very bad; 5 very good)
Indicators 
             
Number of 
Responses
Mod Mean
                            
Standard
Deviation
Communication 
service 52 4 3.87 0.793
The electric 
power 51 4 3.51 1.189
Transportation 
service 52 3 3.4 0.774
Roads 50 3 3.22 1.016
Functioning of 
government 51 3 3.16 1.007
The parliament 50 3 2.8 0.857
Judicial system 52 3 2.65 0.861
As seen from the survey, the functioning of the judicial 
system and the predictability of rules and regulations 
are perceived as signiﬁ cant by respondents. In order 
to get speciﬁ c results, I asked questions regarding the 
year 2001 and the year 2006, in order to see whether 
any progress had taken place in ﬁ ve years on these 
speciﬁ c issues. In order to get speciﬁ c results, I offered 
speciﬁ c statements and asked if the respondents agreed 
with the statements or not. 
The responses to the statement reveal that there was 
progress in obtaining information on the laws and 
regulations affecting respondents’ ﬁ rms (Table 10). 
Considering the year 2001, 15 respondents stated that 
receiving information on the laws and regulations was 
easy to obtain, whereas regarding the year 2006 the 
number of respondents agreeing with the statement 
reached 37. Twelve respondents disagreed with the 
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statement for the year 2001, whereas this number de-
creased to four for 2006. The number of indifferent re-
spondents decreased from 24 for 2001, to 10 for 2006. 
Especially during the interviews, one of the important 
tasks that executives faced was the interpretations of 
regulations. Most of the executives stated that, al-
though signiﬁ cant changes took place in many areas 
such as the legislative and judicial system, and dif-
ferent interpretations of laws affect their operations 
negatively (Table 11). However, the table demonstrates 
that over the years, the number of respondents consid-
ering the interpretations of regulations as predictable 
and consistent increase signiﬁ cantly. Regarding 2001, 
eight respondents believed in the consistency and pre-
dictability of regulations whereas, by 2006, the number 
increased to 22. 
While the share of respondents decreased, the number 
of indifferent respondents, only slightly changed. 
These results suggest that for the respondents, access 
to the information ofn laws and regulations, and the 
predictability and consistency of the regulations re-
garding their business improved during ﬁ ve years.       
However, according to respondents, while the predict-
ability and consistency of regulations related to their 
business increased, in general, they are skeptical about 
the certainty and predictability of the general policy 
changes in the country (Table 12). The lowest mean 
scores in the survey are related to the predictability 
of changes in rules, laws and regulations (2.37 mean 
score) and changes in economic and ﬁ nancial policies 
(2.22).  Law-making procedures often lack participa-
tion of the people subject to it. Business organizations 
in Turkey complain that they are often not consulted 
when important legislation for the business environ-
ment is being drafted; this  again indicates that most 
ofﬁ cials do not see investors as a constituency which 
they should heed. The business community feels left 
out in the democratic process of discussing changes in 
the legislation.
5. Conclusions
The ﬁ ndings presented in this paper, when incorporated 
with the existing works on FDI, provide an explanation 
of the distribution of foreign direct investment across 
countries. The empirical results point to the importance 
of political and economic institutions for foreign direct 
investment.
In this paper, my results point out that the effect of 
macroeconomic indicators such as market size, growth 
rate, GDP per capita on FDI is positive. In addition, 
what this study suggests is that institutional variables 
such as low level of corruption, government stability, 
enforcement of contract law, functioning of judicial 
system, transparent, legal and regulatory framework, 
political and economic stability, intellectual property 
rights, efﬁ ciency of justice and prudential standards 
have also signiﬁ cant impact on FDI in Turkey. 
These results make a real contribution to the empirical 
literature by validating the role of a large set of insti-
tutional variables on foreign direct investment ﬂ ows 
and they are encouraging in the sense that efforts to-
wards raising the quality of institutions may help Tur-
key to receive more FDI, hence help the country to 
Table 10. Statement 1: “In general, information on the laws and regulations affecting my ﬁ rm is easy to obtain” 
 Years                         2001                                                                     2006
Number of ﬁ rms  Agree Disagree  No Idea   Agree Disagree No Idea
51 15 12 24 37 4 10
Table 11. Statement 2: “In general, interpretations of regulations affecting my ﬁ rm are consistent and predictable” 
 Years                         2001                                                                     2006
Number of ﬁ rms  Agree Disagree  No Idea   Agree Disagree No Idea
51 8 27 16 22 17 12
Table 12. Changes in economic and ﬁ nancial policies are 
(1:highly unpredictable; 5: highly predictable)
Indicators 
             
Number of 
Responses
Mod Mean
                            
Standard
Deviation
Changes in 
rules, laws and 
regulations 51 3 2.37 0.999
Changes in 
economic and 
ﬁ nancial policies 50 3 2.22 0.996
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enjoy higher values of GDP per capita. The results of 
the study reveal that the nature of the interaction be-
tween MNCs and each country is the result of a more 
complex set of factors than only market size or mar-
ket-related variables orientation. It takes place within 
the host country’s unique economic, social, and legal 
structures; it involves institutions. 
As a rule, legal infrastructures, including legal system 
development and enforcement, are generally weak in 
most developing countries. Bribery and corruption are 
obviously more invasive in emerging markets than in 
advanced economies. The roles of law and judicial sys-
tems differ among countries. The gap between the law 
on the books and the law in practice can be vast. Legal 
standards tend to be ideals, not necessarily achievable.
A stable, reliable, business climate will lower costs, 
thereby encouraging FDI. Avoiding problems with 
regulatory, bureaucratic and judicial hurdles, property 
rights, enforceable contracts, performance and content 
requirements, or bribe payments will be seen as posi-
tive because they reduce risk and uncertainty. 
Recently, Turkey has made considerable progress in 
modernizing its business legislation. In the ﬁ rst half 
of the 1980s there were major reforms, and a second 
wave that began in the mid-1990s is still underway. 
While there are some gaps in the body of laws and 
regulations, poor implementation of existing legisla-
tion is the main problem. Missing implementing rules 
and administrative guidelines, inconsistent application 
of laws, incompetent bureaucrats in charge, and lack of 
judicial enforcement are the main problems.
In order to increase the quality of institutions in order 
to enjoy high economic growth rates and receive high 
levels of FDI inﬂ ows the state should adopt several 
policies such as introduction of independent regula-
tory agencies in various ﬁ elds such as competition, 
banking, and telecommunications; adoption of modern 
legislation to protect industrial property rights; invita-
tion of all relevant business association to comment on 
draft legislation. 
In conclusion, the ability of countries to beneﬁ t from 
investment activities is inﬂ uenced by active policies. 
By providing the appropriate legal and institutional en-
vironment, host country governments can create con-
ditions that will not only attract foreign investors, but 
also encourage local ﬁ rms to expand their investment 
or to establish new operations.
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classical economists assume but because the corporation mak-
ing the investment possessed some special skill or techniques 
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not available to local entrepreneurs that it could exploit only 
through direct ownership.
9 Economic institutions matter for economic growth because 
they shape the incentives of the key economic actors in so-
ciety; in particular, they inﬂ uence investments in physical 
and human capital and technology, and the organization of 
production. Political institutions help to regulate the limits of 
political power and determine how political power changes 
hands (constitution, electoral rules, the number of veto play-
ers, etc).
10 However, some should pay attention to the facts that results 
can be considered to be subjective and more important, they 
measure the perceptions of institutional quality rather than its 
actual quality. Therefore, in this paper, what I am concerned 
about is not the actual institutional quality, but its perceptions 
on the quality of institutions.
11 In the FIAS ﬁ eld survey, conducted through YASED (In-
ternational Investors Association) to 56 foreign investors 
in Turkey, more than 50 percent of existing investors have 
invested in Turkey for its large domestic market, skilled and 
cost-effective labour (FIAS 2001).  
12 IMD, World Competitiveness Yearbook. 2000. Other com-
parisons in this document show other dimensions of competi-
tive nature of the Turkish work force.
13 A FIAS study on “Facilitating Foreign Participation in Priva-
tization,” for a sample of 36 countries implementing privati-
zation programs concluded that every dollar of privatization 
revenues attracted on average an additional 88 cents in FDI. 
See: Megyery and Sader 1996.
14 See: Hare et al. (1999: 1–30).
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